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RECENT DEVELOPMENT

FRIEDMAN v. HANNAN: THE AUTOMATIC REVOCATION
·OF WILL PROVISIONS "RELATING TO" A SPOUSE UPON
DECEDENT'S MARITAL DISSOLUTION IS NOT LIMITED
TO BEQUESTS MADE TO OR FOR THE DIRECT BENEFIT
OF THE FORMER SPOUSE, AND THEY MAY BE EXTENDED
TO BEQUESTS TO RELATIVES OF THE FORMER SPOUSE.
By: CaHin Talbert

T

he Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a statute, which
mandates the revocation of will provisions relating to the former
spouse following dissolution of the marriage, is not restricted in its
effect to gifts for the direct benefit of that former spouse. Friedman v.
Hannan, 412 Md. 328,987 A.2d 60 (2010). Specifically, bequests by
a decedent to a former spouse's family members "relate to" the spouse
and will be revoked pursuant to section 4-1 05(4) of the Estates and
Trusts Article of the Maryland Code, absent evidence that the bequests
were made for reasons independent of the marital relationship. Id. at
348, 987 A.2d at 72.
On June 5, 1981, James Hannan ("Decedent") married Anna
Zelinski ("Zelinski"). The two later divorced on February 6, 200l.
Decedent died on September 10, 2006, never having remarried.
During his marriage to Zelinski, Decedent drafted and executed a will,
presumably on his own and without the help of a lawyer, which he did
not revoke or amend prior to his death. Item Four of the will provided
for the liquidation of Decedent's real and personal property and
division of the proceeds equally between. "[Decedent's] surviving
immediate family members and those surviving immediate family
members of [his] Wife." The provision then listed the members of
those groups individually, by name.
Decedent's brother, Jerome B. Hannan ("Hannan"), filed the will
with the Register of Wills and was appointed Personal Representative
of Decedent's estate. On May 16, 2007, the Orphans' Court for
Baltimore City ordered that the will not be admitted to probate,
effectively leaving Decedent intestate.
The former spouse's
immediate family members (collectively, "Friedman") and Hannan
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both appealed to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. The circuit
court found that Item Four was a residuary clause, that Decedent,
therefore, died testate, and that only the immediate family members of
Decedent were to receive proceeds from the estate. The Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed the decision of the trial court.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland subsequently granted Friedman's
petition for writ of certiorari.
The central issue in this case is whether the divorce of Decedent
and Zelinski effectuated a revocation of the bequest to Friedman in
Item Four of the will. Friedman, 412 Md. at 336, 987 A.2d at 65.
Section 4-105(4) of the Estates and Trusts Article sets forth that
divorce, when subsequent to the execution of a will, is a circumstance
under which "all provisions in the will relating to the spouse, and only
those provisions," may be revoked. Id. (quoting MD. CODE ANN., EST.
& TRUSTS § 4-105(4) (2001)). To determine whether the statute
allowed the automatic revocation of the Friedman bequest, the court
examined the meaning of the phrase "relating to the spouse" and the
Decedent's expressed intent in creating the bequest. Id. at 337-39,987
A.2d at 65-66.
Friedman contended that the statutory phrase "relating to the
spouse" called for a narrow reading, mandating revocation only where
the bequests were made to or for the direct benefit of the spouse. Id. at
337, 987 A.2d at 65. The Court of Appeals of Maryland rejected
Friedman's argument, however, and read the phrase "relating to"
broadly, which allowed its application to encompass bequests made to
persons other than the spouse, as well. Id. at 338-39, 987 A.2d at 66.
Following the principles of statutory interpretation, the court
determined that the plain meaning of "relate" and, by extension,
"relating to," required only that there be a connection between two
subjects, not that they be identical. Id. at 338, 987 A.2d at 66.
Therefore, the court held, when deciding whether a particular bequest
is one "relating to the spouse" under section 4-1 05(4), the trier of fact,
in the application of such a broad phrase, is not limited to only those
bequests to or for the benefit of the spouse. Friedman, 412 Md. at
338-39, 987 A.2d at 66.
Further, the court noted that, if the General Assembly intended
section 4-105(4) to apply more narrowly, inclusion of the term
"relating to" would be superfluous. Id. at 339, 987 A.2d at 66-67.
The court reasoned that the choice to use the term, rather than to direct
revocation of only those provisions "for the former spouse," indicated
that a broad reading of the statute was proper. Id. The court
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determined that the General Assembly created section 4-105(4) of the
Estates and Trusts Article to provide a far-reaching remedy to avoid
unintended consequences resulting from a testator's failure to change
his or her will upon divorce. Id. at 345, 987 A.2d at 70. In doing so,
the General Assembly recognized two major features of divorce:
divorce generally results in the division of assets that were jointly
owned, and it is usually hostile, with the bitterness typically emanating
to the former spouse's family, as well. Id.
Hannan argued that a broad reading of the phrase "relating to the
spouse" required analysis of the connection between the two subjects
with respect to the intent of the Decedent. Id. at 337,987 A.2d at 65.
Hannan contended that, where the connection lies in the relationship
between the former spouse and the legatees, so that the bond between
the Decedent and the legatees has no basis absent the marriage,
revocation is necessary to effectuate the Decedent's intent. Friedman,
412 Md. at 337, 987 A.2d at 65. In accepting this argument, the court
noted that, when construing a will, the principal duty of the trial court
is to ascertain and accomplish the testator's intended objective. ld. at
339, 987 A.2d at 67 (quoting Pfeufer v. Cyphers, 397 Md. 643, 649,
919 A.2d 641, 645 (2007)). Appellate review of this type of fact
driven decision, therefore, is limited to determining whether the trial
court's fact-findings were clearly erroneous or whether an error oflaw
was made. Id.
Friedman asserted that such an error of law was in fact made,
claiming that the trial court improperly considered the tenuous
relationship between Decedent and members of his former spouse's
family in its determination as to whether the bequest in Item Four was
"related to" that spouse for the purposes of section 4-1 05(4) of the
Estates and Trusts Article. Id. at 344, 987 A.2d at 70. The court was
not persuaded by this argument, however, noting that, when
ascertaining intent, the court can consider relationships of the testator
and those parties to whom the testator made a gift. Id. at 340, 987
A.2d at 67 (quoting Robinson v. Mercantile Trust Co. of Bait., 180
Md. 336, 339, 24 A.2d 299, 300 (1942)). Furthermore, the court
noted, in a case involving a will drawn by a layperson, the court
should gather indications of intent from the four comers of the will
viewed in the context of a person in the testator's situation, giving
special consideration to the circumstances in place at the time of the
execution. Id. (quoting Pfeufer, 397 Md. at 649, 919 A.2d at 645;
Shriner's Hasps. v. Md. Nat'l Bank, 270 Md. 564,570,312 A.2d 546,
550 (1973); Hebden v. Keim, 196 Md. 45, 48, 75 A.2d 126, 128
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(1950)). This reasoning is consistent with a similar ruling from
California, which held that the testator intended to create two groups of
legatees based on his description of those legatees as members of a group
identified by familial ties, as opposed to specific member~.ofthe group as
individuals. Friedman, 412 Md. at 344,987 A.2d at 69 (citing Hermon v.
Urteago, 39 Cal.App.4th 1525,46 Cal.Rptr.2d 577,579 (1995)).
The Court of Appeals of Maryland concluded that such a "groupminded" approach appropriately called for the revocation of class gifts in
the context of section 4-1 05(4) of the Estates and Trusts Article. Id. at
344, 987 A.2d at 69-70. As a result, the trial court was correct in its
conclusion that Decedent would not have intended the bequest to
Friedman to survive a divorce based on his primary identification of the
legatees according to their respective groups. Id. at 344-45, 987 A.2d at
70. Further, the Court of Appeals of Maryland gave little weight to the
secondary naming of the individuals included in Item Four, viewing the
placement of the word "and" between the last two persons of each group
as Decedent's intention to create two separate units. Id. at 346, 987 A.2d
at 71. Finally, the court recognized Decedent's choice to describe the
Friedman group as the immediate family members of his "Wife," as
opposed to simply referring to Zelinski by name, thus cementing
evidence of Decedent's intent for the class to inherit only if he remained
married. Id.
In Friedman v. Hannan, the Court of Appeals of Maryland clarified
that the dictates of section 4-105(4) of the Estates and Trusts Article
extend to groups of immediate family members of a former spouse. In
doing so, the court determined that, to preserve a bequest to such a group
upon a decedent's marital dissolution, there must be evidence of an
intention to do so on the part of the decedent. As a result, Friedman
provides testators with the flexibility to make a gift that they otherwise
would not have made, absent the existence of their marriage, while still
protecting their assets in the event that divorce and death occur, prior to
revocation of the will as a whole. Attorneys should still be aware that, if
a testator makes bequests to a former spouse's family members
individually, or as a result of a reason independent of the marriage, a
subsequent divorce may not result in revocation of the provision. Despite
the protection of the automatic revocation and a couple's likely aversion
to contemplating the possible dissolution of their marriage, Friedman
should ultimately serve as another reason for attorneys to encourage their
clients to update their wills regularly, especially following a major life
event, such as a divorce or a death in the family.

